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224 Abstract
25
26 There are long-standing debates about the effectiveness and social impacts of enforcement-based 
27 conservation, particularly as investments into enforcement increase in response to growing alarm 
28 about Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT). However, there is little data on the people subject to this 
29 enforcement, including prison sentences, species targeted, what motivates and deters them, and 
30 the social impacts of enforcement. This study identified 384 individuals across Nepal who were 
31 in prison for IWT offences in late 2016, and involved interviews (n=116) focused on 
32 respondents’ trade practices, economic circumstances and motivations.  IWT prisoners 
33 represented 10-20% of the total prison populations in two regions and often received stiff 
34 sanctions, with a range of downstream impacts on respondents’ families. Most respondents were 
35 arrested for their involvement in the rhinoceros trade (61%). Most were poor (56%) and from 
36 indigenous communities (75%), highlighting potentially inequitable impacts of enforcement. 
37 Despite common assumptions about the links between IWT,  poverty and organised crime, most 
38 respondents were motivated by the desire to earn extra income and by the ease of IWT compared 
39 to other employment. IWT was neither a primary livelihood strategy, nor had the attributes for 
40 formal organised crime. Respondents, particularly poor respondents, seemed to underestimate 
41 the risks of detection and incompletely understood the scale of sanctions. Improved public 
42 awareness about the scale and social impacts of sanctions could help increase deterrence effects 
43 while reducing unintended social harms of enforcement.
44
45 Keywords: conservation criminology; deterrence; enforcement; wildlife trade 
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346 1. Introduction
47 Hundreds of millions of dollars have been recently invested to address Illegal Wildlife Trade 
48 (IWT) globally, heavily focused on enforcement-based approaches to conservation in developing 
49 countries (Duffy and Humphrey 2014; WB, 2016; Biggs et al., 2017).  This has included 
50 investments to arm, train and support park rangers; introduction of “shoot on sight” policies in 
51 several countries; military and private security deployments to monitor threatened wildlife; 
52 efforts to increase fines and prison sentences; and the introduction of new monitoring 
53 technologies such as drones and automatic cameras  (Biggs et al., 2017; e.g., Hanoi Statement, 
54 2016; WCS, 2016; TRAPS, 2017).
55
56 These trends have spurred global debate over enforcement-based and militarized conservation 
57 (e.g., Challender et al., 2014; Biggs et al., 2017; McCann, 2017; Gray and Gountlet, 2017; 
58 Büscher, 2018), including their purported effectiveness at protecting biodiversity, and the 
59 potential for negative social repercussions, such as the criminalisation of local resource users, 
60 including poor and  indigenous communities (Duffy, 2014; Cooney et al., 2016; Milner-Gulland 
61 et al., 2018). There is also mounting interest in the relative benefits of enforcement-based 
62 strategies versus alternatives, such as demand reduction, incentives and alternative livelihood 
63 development (e.g., Challender et al., 2014; Veríssimo and Wan, 2018; Holden et al., 2018). 
64 While there is uncertainty over the long-term social and environmental outcomes of increased 
65 enforcement spending, IWT rates have often remained high even in the context of increased 
66 enforcement (e.g., see Biggs et al., 2013; Challender et al., 2014). Evidence from other sectors, 
67 notably drug enforcement, highlights the limitations of enforcement-focused approaches, 
68 particularly given growing focus on reducing the unintended social impacts of drug enforcement 
Page 3 of 34 Conservation Science and Practice
469 among both producers and consumers (e.g., Poret, 2002; Stevens, 2013; Blaustein et al., 2017). 
70 Yet, traditional enforcement remains an important part of conservation that is unlikely to be 
71 replaced by other interventions (Phelps et al., 2014), although there is a clear need to explore 
72 strategies through which to increase its effectiveness and efficiency while also reducing 
73 unintentional social harms. 
74
75 Despite widespread investment effort, data on the people subject to enforcement—including 
76 arrest, prosecution and sentencing rates--are often scattered, inaccessible and unanalysed (if 
77 collected at all), while data on demographics, types of offences and motivations are infrequently 
78 collected (see Kahler and Gore, 2012; Duffy et al., 2016). These data are not only important to 
79 empirically grounding the growing body of scholarship on social dimensions of conservation, but 
80 also to designing more nuanced enforcement strategies that target specific drivers and 
81 motivations behind participation in IWT (see Phelps et al., 2016).   
82
83 Nepal exemplifies enforcement-based approaches to IWT (McLean and Straede, 2003). Widely 
84 recognised for its collaboratively-managed community forests, Nepal also has strong 
85 enforcement-based responses to IWT of charismatic species (Yonzon, 2006; Sinha, 2010). This 
86 includes nearly 7,000 military personnel monitoring protected areas (Nepal Army, 2018), 
87 automatic cameras to monitor wildlife (BBC, 2015), and a wave of IWT operations by its Central 
88 Investigation Bureau and Wildlife Crime Control Bureaus. Between 2009 and 2014, the number 
89 of wildlife seizures increased 10 fold, and IWT arrests increased 8.6 fold (Paudel, 2015). 
90 Nepalese law also stipulates high prison sentences and fines for people convicted of IWT 
91 offences, and recently increased sanctions for involvement in illegal international trade 
Page 4 of 34Conservation Science and Practice
592 (summary of legislation in Supplementary Table 1). These strategies have reportedly improved 
93 conservation outcomes, resulting in a "zero poaching year" in Chitwan National Park (Aryal et 
94 al., 2017).
95
96 These investments demonstrate Nepal’s commitment to criminal justice responses to wildlife 
97 crime, yet ongoing incidences of domestic and international IWT demonstrate failings in their 
98 effectiveness. While punishment is an important part of the overall approach, conservation also 
99 relies on preventing offences from happening in the first place. Prevention is partially addressed 
100 by situational crime prevention techniques aimed at making it harder for potential motivated 
101 offenders to commit crimes in the first place, and this approach has been explored within the 
102 context of IWT (e.g., Lemieux, 2014; Moreto & Pires, 2018; Pires & Moreto 2011). However, 
103 prevention also depends on reducing the numbers of potential motivated offenders through the 
104 deterrence effect of criminal justice sanctions, which is the focus of this paper. Deterrence  
105 theory suggests that the effectiveness of criminalisation and enforcement as a deterrent depends 
106 on the severity, celerity (swiftness) and certainty of punishment outweighing the motivations for 
107 participating in crime.  This is also dependent on would-be offenders being aware of the law and 
108 the accompanying risk of penalty (Beccaria, 1764; see Nagin et al., 2018 for a thorough 
109 discussion of contemporary deterrence theory).
110
111 This study considers why people commit IWT, despite the increases in law enforcement activity 
112 and criminal sentences in the Nepali context. It draws on in-depth interviews with prisoners 
113 (n=116) across seven jails in Nepal. It describes (1) the people subject to enforcement 
114 (demographics, roles within IWT); (2) their offences and sentences, including broader social 
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6115 impacts of their imprisonment, and (3) the reasons behind their involvement in IWT (self-
116 reported motivations, knowledge of sanctions, perceptions of risk). It is, to our knowledge, the 
117 first large sample study with people jailed for IWT (although see Hariohay et al. 2019). We 
118 believe that it is also the first large study interviewing people imprisoned for environmental 




123 With permission granted by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation and the 
124 Department for Prison Management in Nepal, we contacted the information officers of all 
125 prisons in Nepal (74) via telephone to identify the number of people currently incarcerated for 
126 faunal IWT (Oct. 2016; Supplementary Table 2; a small number of arrests for rosewood trade 
127 were not included as these offenders are categorised differently within the Nepalese prison 
128 system and it was not possible to easily identify and gain access to these offenders within the 
129 research period. As such, we focused on offenders involved in trade in fauna for this project). Of 
130 the 74 prisons, 38 sites held people for wildlife crimes, and we conducted interviews with 
131 prisoners (n=116) across 7 of these during 2016-2017. For purposes of convenience, we targeted 
132 the 5 prisons with the largest IWT prisoner populations and the 2 prisons in closest proximity to 
133 Kathmandu (see Supplementary Figure 1).
134 Respondents at the largest prison (Bharatpur prison, Chitwan) were selected from a list of people 
135 arrested for IWT in that prison, using the “randomise” function in Excel (31.4% of the 
136 population). Where a potential respondent opted not to participate, the next person on the list was 
137 approached.  At the other sites, we sought to interview all prisoners, which was feasible due to 
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7138 the small populations. Of the 109 people approached in the first round of interviews at Chitwan, 
139 Kathmandu Central, Kathmandu Jagannath, Bardiya and Parsa prisons (October 2016 to 
140 February 2017), 88 participated (19.3% refusal rate). We then conducted a second round of 
141 interviews to increase our sample size at Lalitpur, Rasuwa and Chitwan prions (June-August 
142 2017). In this round 45 people were approached and 28 participated, with the refusal rate 
143 (37.8%) climbing following reports that the government was further charging prisoners for their 
144 historic involvement in IWT. This happens as new information comes to light, and was not 
145 connected to this research, of which we reassured participants prior to gaining consent. 
146 Interviews were conducted in Nepali by the lead author, a male who grew up in rural Nepal and 
147 has a personal understanding of wild resource harvest and prior experience conducting 
148 interviews in prison setting (Paduel, 2015). Prior to interviews, we obtained informed oral 
149 consent, following established ethical standards for criminological research (BSC, 2006) and 
150 institutional review (Lancaster University FST REC 16045), including explanation that 
151 participation was voluntary, anonymous, and would not affect respondents’ sentences.  
152 Interviews lasted approximately 1 hour, having been granted national permission for extended 
153 visiting times (usually 20 minutes), and were conducted in private.  As audio-recording was 
154 forbidden under prison rules, responses were recorded manually on the research instrument, with 
155 more detailed notes written up after each interview.
156 Interviews were structured (full interview schedule in English and Nepali available in 
157 Supplementary Materials) and primarily involved closed questions, including multiple response, 
158 ranking, Likert-scale and short-answer questions, split into 8 sections: (1) respondent 
159 demographics; (2) employment and income, including household income, economic situation 
160 and food security; (3) involvement in IWT, including age and year of first involvement, roles 
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8161 participated in, species hunted and traded; (4) current crime and sentence;  (5) motives for 
162 participating in IWT; (6) knowledge of IWT laws and regulation; (7) perception of deterrence, 
163 including perceptions of the risk of being caught, and; (8) social impacts of their incarceration, 
164 including impacts on family.  Our questions about their knowledge of IWT laws and penalties 
165 were informed by a review of wildlife legislation in Nepal and the associated species-wise 
166 sanctions (Supplementary Table 1). We included some open questions throughout the interview 
167 to follow up on responses to closed questions, including further exploration of respondents’ 
168 experiences with imprisonment as a result of IWT and the impacts this had on their families.
169 Data from closed questions were coded and analysed using SPSS v.24 to generate descriptive 
170 statistics and, using Spearman’s Rho correlations, to explore the relationships among variables.  
171 We specifically looked at what variables would help us understand variation in respondents’ 
172 awareness of the laws.  For this, three interview questions about knowledge of IWT regulations 
173 were combined into a single ordinal variable, “Overall awareness of laws” (range 0-4, using the 
174 first three variables in Table 4).  We then tested what variables might be explanatory, expecting 
175 age, education and economic status to be potential predictors of variation in their knowledge of 
176 regulations (Supplementary Table 3).  We also explored the relationships between reported 
177 motives for participating in IWT and demographic variables, again expecting that factors such as 
178 economic status would correlate with motivations such as nutritional and basic economic need 
179 (Supplementary Table 4). However, quantitative analyses options were limited by the sample 
180 size and heterogeneity within the dataset (e.g., Chi Square results not valid, sample too small for 
181 meaningful Latent Class Analysis), and those that we could conduct revealed few significant 
182 relationships. Qualitative data from our open questions was subject to simple, manual thematic 
183 analysis that involved generating initial codes and collecting illustrative quotes, and then 
Page 8 of 34Conservation Science and Practice
9184 searching, reviewing and reducing themes (Braun & Clarke, 2019). For this paper, the only 
185 qualitative data we draw on are examples of social impacts of imprisonment (see section 3.2). 
186 2.1 Collecting data on illegal activity
187 Researching illegal resource activities can be challenging due to issues such as sensitivity and 
188 social desireability (Ruggiero & Khan, 2006; Keane et al., 2008). However, this study employed 
189 direct questioning, the validity of which is increasingly recognised in research on illegal drugs 
190 (MKG, 2007) and on illegal natural resource use (Gavin et al., 2010; Hinsley et al., 2017).  Our 
191 interviews occurred in the prison context, which potentially presents fewer concerns about 
192 respondent integrity and fewer ethical issues, when compared with research on active offenders.
193 Our sample is not representative of all IWT offenders in Nepal. The sample has geographic bias 
194 (e.g., towards lowlands with the largest IWT prison populations), which may have affected data 
195 on species, such as the underrepresentation of high elevation species (e.g., snow leopards). The 
196 sample only includes IWT participants who were arrested and jailed for their offences, so 
197 excludes IWT participants who were not caught, avoided jail time and/or committed offences not 
198 deemed severe enough to receive prison sentences. Our sample likely includes a disproportionate 
199 number of respondents serving longer sentences. While it is not possible to be sure of the reasons 
200 individuals refused to participate, we anticipate that refusals were more likely among offenders 
201 involved in organised crime roles. Taken together, our sample is best interpreted as illustrative of 
202 people involved in domestic harvest and trade roles who have been subject to arrest and 
203 imprisonment and who were willing to participate in interviews.
204 3. Results
205 3.1 Respondent IWT roles and demographics
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206 Out of 74 prisons across Nepal, 38 prisons hosted a total of 384 IWT prisoners during the start of 
207 research in late 2016 (Figure 1, Supplementary Table 2), although no historical baseline has been 
208 compiled to enable comparison. People convicted for IWT represented a small part of the prison 
209 population at most sites (0.1-3.3%), but formed 21.1% of the total prison populations in Chitwan 
210 District Prison, 9.6% in Bardia District Prison and 6.4% in Rasuwa District Prison.
211
212 Respondents participated in a range of roles across IWT market chains, including harvest, 
213 transport and retail. Harvest was the most common role reported, and only a small number of 
214 respondents were involved in international transport (12%, Table 1). Nearly one third of 
215 respondents reported involvement in only one role (31.9%), 39.7% participated in two or three 
216 different IWT activities and 15.5% reported having participated in four or more different roles, 
217 while 12.9% (n=15) did not respond to this question. Involvement in IWT was usually part of a 
218 group (54.3%) and often in response to a request from a specific customer (47.4%).
219
220 [Table 1 here]
221
222 The respondents were overwhelmingly male (99.1%), with an average age of 36 at time of arrest 
223 (range 17-70). The vast majority 75%, were from the Janajati group of castes (75%), which are 
224 largely marginalised indigenous communities from the Tamang, Chaudhary and Chepang/Praja 
225 castes.  Educational levels varied, including numerous illiterate respondents (31.9%; Table 2). 
226
227 [Table 2 here]
228
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229 Most respondents self-reported as ‘poor’ across several metrics (Table 3). Self-reported 
230 household income at the time of arrest placed most respondents’ households under the World 
231 Bank defined poverty line for Nepal (56.0%; approx. US $ 1.9/person/day). Most respondents 
232 also reported that their household income was not enough on which to survive (36.2%) or only 
233 enough to cover the day-to-day costs of living (47.4%), with >80% of respondents responsible 
234 for at least one dependent (Table 2).
235
236 Participation in IWT was an additional source of income for the vast majority of our respondents, 
237 with only 10.3% reporting IWT as their primary occupation before arrest. Respondents reported 
238 primary employment across a range of other sectors, but often in insecure jobs within the 
239 informal sector, including agriculture (28.4%), informal wage labour (14.7%), transport (8.6%), 
240 skilled trades (8.6%) and mobile traders (e.g., of crops, carpets, 8.6%).  Many held jobs that 
241 involved moving from place-to-place.  Notable others included two military officials, two 
242 politicians and three secondary school students.
243 [Table 3 here]
244
245 3.2 Offences, penalties and social impacts
246 Most respondents were convicted for the harvest and trade of a small number of species: 
247 Rhinoceros unicornis (Greater One-horned Rhinoceros) (61.2%), Panthera tigris tigris (Royal 
248 Bengal Tiger) (13.8%) and Ailurus fulgens (Red Panda) (12.1%), and were focused in lowland 
249 protected areas (Chitwan and Bardia National Parks). Fines and prison sentences varied across 
250 cases and taxa (Figure 1; see Supplementary Table 1). Maximum sanctions were imposed in 
251 some cases, notably for rhinoceros, including approx. US$960 fine and >10 years imprisonment.   
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252
253 [Figure 1 Here]
254
255 Nearly half of respondents described additional negative impacts on their families’ livelihoods or 
256 children’s education as a result of their imprisonment, with 14.5% reporting both. Respondents 
257 also described other social impacts, including divorce or estrangement from their wife (n=12); 
258 family members having to work harder (n=11, including 2 reports of family members having to 
259 take jobs in other countries); having to sell property or close businesses (n=8), and stigma or loss 
260 of prestige (n=7, including 1 parental suicide, 1 family changing religion, and 1 daughter unable 
261 to marry).
262 3.3 Awareness of law and perceived risk
263 Most respondents reported that they were aware, prior to their arrest, that IWT was illegal 
264 (93.1%), although few knew the scale of related fines and imprisonment (Table 4), and only one 
265 third stated concern about the possibility of arrest (34.5%). More than half (52.6%) were 
266 convicted within one year of their first reported involvement with IWT. Only a minority (8.6%) 
267 were repeat offenders, and 16.4% of respondents planned to return to IWT post-release 
268 (including 4 of the existing repeat offenders).
269
270 Respondent awareness of laws correlated moderately with household economic status ( r=0.425; 
271 p<0.01, see Table 3) and household food situation ( r=0.318; p<0.01), suggesting that poorer 
272 respondents were less likely to be aware of the risks of penalty (although direct economic 
273 measures of poverty, such as reported household income, were not significantly related to overall 
274 awareness of laws; see Supplementary Table 3).
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275 [Table 4 here] 
276
277 3.4 Motives for participating in IWT 
278 Respondents reported diverse motivations for participation in IWT (Table 5).  Few relied on it as 
279 a primary livelihood, and direct household need was not a leading reported motivation (e.g., 
280 money to meet basic needs, 11.2%; IWT to meet nutritional needs, 6.0%). Instead, IWT served 
281 primarily to earn extra money (87.9%) and represented a less tiring job than alternative sources 
282 of income (37.1%). Family food situation was weakly correlated to the motivation of nutritional 
283 need (r=0.249; p<0.01) and moderately correlated to the motivation of needing money to meet 
284 basic household needs, and household economic status was moderately related to needing money 
285 to meet basic household needs (r=.452; p<0.01). We also identified a weak correlation between 
286 age of first involvement in IWT and the motivation of finding IWT easier than other work 
287 options (r=.286; p<0.01).  No significant relationships were found between reported motivations 
288 and demographic variables (Supplementary Table 4).
289
290 [Table 5 here]
291
292 4. Discussion
293 Amidst widespread calls for strengthened enforcement to protect biodiversity from IWT, we 
294 know very little about the people being imprisoned for these crimes.  This study provides unique 
295 demographic and motivational data necessary for developing effective and equitable 
296 conservation policies.  There were clear patterns in respondent demographics, and our sample 
297 was principally poor, illiterate, with 75% coming from historically-marginalised indigenous 
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298 communities (Table 2), although these groups make up only 35.8% of Nepal’s population (CBS, 
299 2011).  However, when considering other variables (e.g. awareness of rules, employment,  
300 motivations), our sample was very heterogeneous. The sample size, while large by the standards 
301 of prison interview research, was too small to make meaningful attempts at using statistical 
302 analysis techniques to develop a typology based on cluster analysis (e.g., via Latent Class 
303 Analysis). Nevertheless, the descriptive data illustrates the diversity of IWT involvement.
304
305 Our findings highlight robust conservation enforcement, particularly for charismatic species 
306 (tigers, rhinoceros) around lowland protected areas, where as much as 10-20% of the overall 
307 local prison populations were people convicted for wildlife crimes.  These imprisonment rates 
308 illustrate not only the scale of enforcement, but also the scope for additional interventions that 
309 aim to help reduce offence rates. On the one hand, penal sanctions can play an important role in 
310 individual and general deterrence. On the other hand, high numbers of incarcerated offenders, 
311 particularly at the local scale in regions such as Chitwan, suggests that the deterrence role could 
312 be more effective. This is especially true given our findings about the lack of awareness of 
313 penalties and the risk of arrest associated with IWT among our sample. While punishment and 
314 other enforcement activity shows a strong response to IWT, that so many people are still ending 
315 up in prison leads us to ask why these people have remained undeterred from participating in 
316 IWT offences.
317
318 Criminology offers insights into how to increase the effectiveness of enforcement-based 
319 conservation approaches in ways that also help to address social equity. In particular, rational 
320 actor perspectives posit that the decision whether or not to commit a crime will depend on the 
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321 balance between the perceived associated risks and rewards. Classic theory argues that the 
322 deterrence effect of a punishment depends on the severity, celerity (swiftness of enforcement) 
323 and certainty of punishment following a crime, weighed against the motivation to commit the 
324 crime in the first place (Nagin et al. 2018). In the context of this sample, punishment turned out 
325 to be certain, severe and swift. All of our respondents were convicted offenders who were 
326 imprisoned (certainty) and experienced considerable sanctions (severity): not only were there 
327 384 people identified as imprisoned for IWT, but we found significant fines and imprisonment 
328 (often >5 years, Figure 1).  Moreover, verdicts indicated the use of judicial discretion to apply 
329 high sanctions, particularly for rhinoceros trade (Figure 1). The results also highlighted a range 
330 of downstream social impacts on respondents and respondents’ families. In addition, most 
331 respondents were arrested shortly after their first involvement in IWT (high celerity). The 
332 persistence of IWT under this enforcement context suggest failing in its deterrence effects, which 
333 may be explained perpetrators’ motives for participating in IWT and the associated risk-reward 
334 calculations. 
335
336 4.1 Motives for IWT participation
337 A range of economic and non-economic factors shape evaluations of the costs and benefits 
338 associated with IWT participation (Cooney et al., 2016). The results demonstrate the role of 
339 poverty in driving some offenders into IWT, as indicated by the relationship between reported 
340 indicators of poverty (food situation, household economic status) and motivations associated 
341 with basic household economic and nutritional needs. Yet, despite high poverty rates among 
342 respondents, most did not report basic household needs—either economic or nutritional—as their 
343 primary motivations for participating in IWT (Table 5). Making extra money was 
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344 overwhelmingly the most common primary motive, followed by the perception that IWT is a less 
345 tiring job that its alternatives. This mirrors our finding that IWT was not pursued as a primary 
346 employment by the vast majority of  respondents, and that often aspiration (rather than 
347 desperation) may be an important IWT driver in some contexts. Peer pressure was also a 
348 commonly reported motive (36.2%), which mirrors findings elsewhere that IWT crimes were 
349 associated with belonging to a particular social or cultural group (e.g., Nurse, 2011, 2013; 
350 Rytterstedt, 2016). Other anticipated motivations such as IWT in response to human-wildlife 
351 conflict, for cultural reasons, and for household use were little reported by the respondents.  
352
353 These findings reflect growing awareness of the diversity and complexity of IWT motives 
354 (Kahler and Gore, 2012; Duffy et al., 2016; Cooney et al., 2016), and the need for more specific 
355 terminology to distinguish among the diverse roles in and motivations for IWT participants (e.g., 
356 Table 1, 5; cf. Phelps et al., 2016). These findings also suggest the need to further interrogate the 
357 types and perceptions of need, even within poor communities, and in the context of how 
358 respondents view themselves (e.g., Mbete et al., 2011; see Duffy et al., 2016). It supports 
359 existing research arguing that poverty reduction alone is unlikely to reduce IWT (TRAFFIC 
360 2008), and suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of motives, so that targeted 
361 interventions can respond to specific drivers. 
362
363 Significantly, reported motives were not explicitly linked to organised crime, which is a leading 
364 narrative in some parts of the conservation community (e.g., London Conference, 2018). In fact, 
365 while respondents reported that IWT was often coordinated with others (54.3%), this seems to 
366 more closely resemble “crime that is organised”, rather than participation in organised crime as 
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367 popularly conceptualised (see Pires et al., 2016). Nevertheless, some respondents were involved 
368 in international trafficking (12%) and nearly half were responding to requests from specific 
369 customers for high-value wildlife products in demand by international markets, which suggests 
370 possible involvement with formal networks. While these individuals may represent bottlenecks 
371 for strategic conservation interventions to disrupt organised networks (see Phelps et al., 2016), 
372 efforts to curb IWT should avoid blindly following logical, but weakly supported narratives, and 
373 ensure that they reflect the diversity of reported motivations. Importantly, while there are clearly 
374 motivations to participate in IWT, these alone do a poor job at explaining the high rates observed 
375 in our dataset.
376
377 4.2 Low awareness of rules, risks and consequences
378 The conditions laid out by classical criminological theory have been largely met for most 
379 respondents in our sample, the results suggest that other, important underlying conditions were 
380 not met.  Notably, deterrence relies not only on the intensity of conservation enforcement (see 
381 Holden et al., 2018), but also relies on people’s awareness of the rules and the consequences of 
382 noncompliance, and the resulting sense of risk.  There was a minority of respondents who, by 
383 virtue of their imprisonment, understood these risks, but who were nevertheless repeat offenders 
384 and/or reported an intention to return to IWT after their release.  For these individuals, existing 
385 enforcement strategies, combined with their risk/reward ratios and underlying motivations, were 
386 inadequate to shift behaviour.  However, this was the exception among the respondents.
387
388 For most respondents, our results suggest information asymmetries in perpetrators’ knowledge 
389 about rules, and possible miscalculations in their perceptions of risk (Table 4). Despite high 
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390 sanctions (Figure 1, Supplementary Table 1), respondents reported low understanding of these 
391 rules (Table 4) and limited concern that they might be arrested, alongside low economic reliance 
392 on IWT (Table 2). As most respondents were arrested shortly after their reported first 
393 participation in IWT, their involvement was also unlikely deeply informed by prior experience or 
394 involvement in professionalised IWT and organised crime. This suggests skewed risk-reward 
395 calculations among many IWT perpetrators, (although this interpretation does not apply to the 
396 minority of repeat offenders).  Despite critiques of the “knowledge deficit model” (e.g., 
397 Heberlein, 2012), it is clear that people can only comply with rules about which they have 
398 knowledge (cf. Ostrom, 1990), and can only evaluate them if they understand the risk associated 
399 with detection, prosecution and sanctions.
400
401 Amidst growing investments into IWT enforcement, public awareness campaigns about IWT 
402 enforcement might increase the deterrence effects of existing enforcement. Such efforts might 
403 address information deficits about regulations and sanctions, noting judicial discretion in 
404 imposing high fines and imprisonment terms, including for taxa that might not be widely 
405 considered conservation priorities likely to face stiff sanctions (e.g., common leopard, owl, 
406 pangolin; Figure 1).
407 Deterrence aims might also be served by publicising the broader non-legal, often unrecorded, 
408 social impacts of enforcement, including on children, marriages and family prestige. These types 
409 of elements have proven important to, for example, reducing driving under the influence of 
410 alcohol, including through highlighting social sanctions and stigma via media campaigns (Elder 
411 et al., 2004; Davey & Freeman, 2011). Such approaches would need to take account of relatively 
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412 low education levels in some target communities, but use of personal stories might be an 
413 effective alternative to simply communicating technical legal details.
414
415 Such expanded public engagement about IWT sanctions is particularly important in the context 
416 of new, often strengthened conservation rules, as are emerging in Nepal and some other countries 
417 (Supplementary Table 1).  Awareness might increase not only the efficiency of existing 
418 enforcement investments but also their undesirable social impacts, where it reduces the 
419 imposition of severe sanctions on marginalised communities. Importantly, it is a comparatively 
420 affordable “add-on” to existing, often high-cost enforcement actions.  In September 2019, the 
421 lead author used data from this project to inform a public awareness campaign in key IWT 
422 hotspots in Nepal. That effort used traditional folk music to communicate the severity of IWT 
423 sanctions and share stories about the downstream social impacts of IWT imprisonment 
424 (http://www.greenhood.org.np/2019/09/03/bankokatha/). There is a clear need to evaluate the 
425 costs and effectiveness of such education-based interventions targeting potential IWT 
426 participants, as has started to happen with education programmes that target consumers 
427 (Veríssimo and Wan, 2018; Holden et al., 2018).
428
429 4.3 Unintended social impacts of enforcement 
430 Getting the balance between enforcement and deterrence right is important not only because for 
431 the effectiveness and efficiency of conservation, but also because our dataset highlights some 
432 key social equity outcomes. These are particularly salient in the context of this study, given the 
433 manginalised cultural, economic and educational status of many of the respondents. Moreover, 
434 poorer respondents were significantly less likely to know the rules. Indeed, IWT often involves 
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435 poor local residents, the “small fish and scapegoats” who are most easily subject to enforcement, 
436 while higher-level “intellectual actors” are infrequently arrested (Ghale, 2017; see Phelps et al., 
437 2016).
438
439 While the results cannot explain why these populations are so disproportionately represented in 
440 our dataset, this skew has significant implications for social equity dimensions of enforcement-
441 based conservation. This apparent targeting exemplifies the differentiated, inequitable social 
442 impacts that can arise from enforcement-based conservation (see West et al., 2006), which are 
443 not a mainstream part of conservation dialogues in Nepal (see Greenhood Nepal, 2018). 
444 Moreover, the imprisonment of indigenous people around Chitwan District Prison overlaps with 
445 a region where thousands of people were previously resettled outside of Chitwan National Park 
446 (McLean and Straede, 2003); 16 respondents reported that they were born within the park—
447 potentially highlighting how current IWT policies may compound the impacts of historical 
448 expropriation of indigenous lands.
449
450 While enforcement resulting in imprisonment does not appear to be heavily targeting traditional 
451 or subsistence IWT activities (e.g., bushmeat harvest), or trade driven primarily by basic 
452 household needs, enforcement burdens are still disproportionately borne by some of Nepal’s 
453 most marginalised people. Moreover, many appear to be systematically underestimating the risks 
454 associated with IWT, particularly in the context of increasingly enforcement-based responses to 
455 IWT. This has profound implications for the efficiency of conservation investments and for 
456 unintended social outcomes. 
457
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458 5. Conclusion
459 Much of the debate over enforcement-based conservation is occurring within a fairly data-poor 
460 context. Analyses of prison trends and prison-based interviews offer insights for conservation 
461 practice and research, and data on enforcement, arrests, sentences and perpetrator profiles (as 
462 well as supplementary data about species, roles, destinations, etc.) should become a routine part 
463 of interventions that promote conservation enforcement. 
464
465 This is meaningful not only because reducing imprisonment is important to individual 
466 perpetrators and their communities, but also because it reflects whether enforcement investments 
467 are resulting in meaningful change. Indeed, there is a need to better reflect on the intended 
468 outcomes that conservation agencies expect will arise from increased enforcement, and there is 
469 concern that many interventions may not be accounting for the causal chains linking actions to 
470 outcomes (see Biggs et al., 2017).  In this case, conservation may best be achieved not through 
471 strengthened enforcement alone, but also by accounting for perpetrator knowledge, motives and 
472 perceptions of risk, as well as enforcement biases towards certain taxa and types of perpetrators. 
473 Strategic modifications might help ensure that enforcement actions are both more effective and 
474 equitable. 
475
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657 8. Figure and Table Captions 
658 Figure 1. Average fine and prison sentence by species (n=99; remaining cases were awaiting 
659 sentencing), compared with maximum allowable sanctions (Supplementary Table 1).
660
661 Table 1. Reported frequency of participation in different roles in illegal wildlife trade (n=116)
662 Table 2. Demographic characteristics of IWT prisoners (n=116)
663 Table 3. Respondents’ self-reported economic status at the time of their arrest (n=116)
664 Table 4. Respondent awareness of sanctions for IWT crimes (n=116)
665 Table 5. Reported motivations for participating in IWT (n=116)
666
667 Table 1. Reported frequency of participation in different roles in illegal wildlife trade (n=116)




Harvesting 14.7 35.3 50.0
Transporting domestically 9.5 12.9 77.6
Informing other harvesters about wildlife habitat and movement 4.4 17.2 78.4
Consuming wildlife at household level 4.3 4.3 91.4
Retailing to intermediaries 3.4 30.2 66.4
Retailing to consumers 3.4 5.2 91.4
Informing other harvesters about conservation enforcement 
(patrolling, movement)
3.4 7.8 88.8
Transporting over an international border 1.7 10.3 87.9
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Long-term storage of wildlife 0.9 17.2 81.9
Supplying wildlife to friends and neighbors
(e.g., local exchange, gifts)
0 11.2 88.8
668






Primary School 41 (35.3)






Indian and Chinese 5 (4.3)
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670
671 Table 3. Respondents’ self-reported economic status at the time of their arrest (n=116)
Indicator Number 
(%)
World Bank poverty line (<US$1.9 per person per day)
Households below poverty line (based on reported household income) 65 (56.0)
Household economic status
Not enough to survive 42 (36.2)
Only enough to cover day-to-day costs 55 (47.4)
Comfortable 14 (12.1)
Well off 5 (4.3)
Household food security
Sometimes children and adults in household do not have enough to eat 7 (6.4)
Sometimes adults in household do not have enough to eat 34 (31.2)
More than enough food to eat 68 (62.4)
672
673 Table 4. Respondent awareness of sanctions for IWT crimes (n=116)
Responses (%)Prior to arrest, were respondents:
Yes No
Aware that IWT is illegal? 93.1 6.9
Aware of the penalties connected to IWT? 30.2 69.8







Page 32 of 34Conservation Science and Practice
33
Concerned about the possibility of arrest? 34.5 65.5
Will you return to IWT after your release? 16.4 83.6
674





Secondary reason Not a reason
To make extra money 87.9 6.9 5.2
Less tiring job than alternatives 37.1 26.7 36.2
Money to meet basic household needs 11.2 26.7 62.1
Peer pressure 10.3 25.9 63.8
Household nutritional needs 6 6.9 87.1
For entertainment 4.3 3.4 92.2
Preference for wild meat 0 6 94.0
To show-off 0 5.2 94.8
In response to human-wildlife conflict 0.9 3.4 95.7
To rebel against government authority 0 1.7 98.3
For cultural & religious reasons 0 0.9 99.1
For ornamental household use 0 0.9 99.1
676
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